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In 2014, the Obama administration announced that the United States would almost entirely adopt 
the global ban on antipersonnel mines, despite longstanding military and political opposition. 
To explain this puzzling outcome, I expand upon recent accounts of rhetorical entrapment in 
which norm-promoting actors seek to compel change in a target actor by exploiting tensions 
between the target’s words and actions. Tracing US policy change over the past 25 years, I show 
how transnational civil society and domestic political elites strategically deployed factual and 
normative claims to draw US officials into an iterative debate concerning the humanitarian harm 
of antipersonnel mines. Successive US administrations have sought to mitigate external critique 
by gradually conceding to the discursive framing of pro-ban advocates without endorsing the 
international treaty prohibiting the weapons. These rhetorical shifts stimulated a search for 
alternative technologies and incremental changes to military doctrine, tactics, and procurement 
that constrained US policy choices culminating in the effective abandonment of antipersonnel 
mines despite ongoing military operations around the globe. 
 
 
In 2014, the United States announced that it would eliminate antipersonnel (AP) landmines 
from its military arsenal, with the exception of its ongoing security commitments on the 
Korean Peninsula.1 President Obama further committed “to continue to work to find ways 
that would allow us to ultimately comply fully and accede to the Ottawa Convention,” the 
1997 international legal instrument eliminating the weapons also known as the Mine Ban 
Treaty (MBT).2 With these acts, the administration sought to reverse long-standing US 
opposition to the global landmine prohibition. Yet the US has not formally acceded to the 
MBT has therefore adopted its norms without a commensurate international legal obligation. 
                                               
1 United States of America, “Statement by Ambassador Griffiths, United States Embassy Maputo,” 
(Third Review Conference of the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, June 27, 2014), 
http://www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/friday/13_HIGH_LEVEL_SEGMENT_-
_United_States.pdf; United States of America, “FACT SHEET: Changes to U.S. Anti-Personnel Landmine 
Policy” (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, September 23, 2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/fact-sheet-changes-us-anti-personnel-
landmine-policy. 
2 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at Clinton Global Initiative” (White House, Office of the 
Press Secretary, September 23, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2014/09/23/remarks-president-clinton-global-initiative. 
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How did the US go from prominent opponent of the AP mine ban to almost entirely 
endorsing its provisions? This is an important question for International Relations scholars 
since it is widely expected that the US both shapes major institutions and is especially well-
placed to resist legal and normative constraints it finds objectionable.3 The AP mine ban 
emerged during the so-called “unipolar moment” of the early post-Cold War period but the 
diplomatic process and outcome defied US demands. While the US grudgingly participated in 
the negotiations, it refused to endorse the final treaty which did not include exemptions for its 
own weapons. Subsequent US adaptation thus poses a puzzle since the US, as the only state 
with global military commitments, should be especially keen to preserve flexibility regarding 
the use of force.  
Prominent materialist and sociological accounts cannot adequately explain the 
transformation in US antipersonnel mine policy over time. Arguments that the changing 
character of war render AP mines irrelevant are incomplete because they overlook the fact 
that the US military habitually opposes the elimination of weapons systems and continues to 
envision a role for AP mines despite a pronounced shift towards high-technology warfare. 
Explanations that rely on persuasion of the target actor via forms of argumentation and 
deliberation are also unsuitable as American policymakers were well informed about the 
humanitarian issues concerning AP mines.4 Interactions between US officials and mine ban 
advocates thus do not exhibit the characteristics of a novice being inducted into a dominant 
knowledge claim or a neutral exchange of ideas aimed at producing a reasoned consensus 
over the problem and its appropriate solution.  
                                               
3 William C. Wohlforth, “US Leadership and the Limits of International Institutional Change,” 
International Journal 62, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 415–21. 
4 Thomas Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics,” International 
Organization 54, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 1–39; Ian Johnstone, The Power of Deliberation: International Law, 
Politics and Organizations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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 I contend that the concept of rhetorical entrapment more effectively captures the 
timing, process, and outcomes of US antipersonnel mine policy over the past 25 years.5 This 
account is closely related to notions of rhetorical action or rhetorical coercion in which actors 
strategically deploy arguments in an attempt to compel their target to accept their preferred 
discursive framing, and thus embodies a synthesis of instrumental and normative logics of 
action.6 Rhetorical entrapment involves efforts by norm-promoting actors to exploit tensions 
between a target actor’s words and actions and draw the target into an ongoing debate on the 
external advocate’s own terms. Successful rhetorical entrapment initiates an iterative cycle 
where the target actor must repeatedly defend its shifting position against external critique, 
limiting the scope of acceptable discourse and stimulating policy changes that can be 
portrayed as enhancing conformance with the referent standard. Importantly, rhetorical 
entrapment does not assume persuasion: change occurs when a target’s existing policy is no 
longer defensible amongst a peer group, raising the social costs of non-conformance, and not 
through the alteration of the underlying beliefs of individuals or groups. 
This article contributes to the further elaboration of rhetorical entrapment in global 
politics by demonstrating its operation in a hard case of international security governance. 
My principal contribution is to show how the United States has been constrained through 
rhetorical practices, and how specific claims have been deployed and subsequently shaped 
the policymaking process. Prominent treatments tend to focus on efforts targeting 
                                               
5 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into 
Domestic Practices: Introduction,” in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, 
ed. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 27–
28; Margarita H. Petrova, “Rhetorical Entrapment and Normative Enticement: How the United Kingdom 
Turned From Spoiler Into Champion of the Cluster Munition Ban,” International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 3 
(September 2016): 387–99; Jean-Frédéric Morin and E. Richard Gold, “Consensus-Seeking, Distrust and 
Rhetorical Entrapment: The WTO Decision on Access to Medicines,” European Journal of International 
Relations 16, no. 4 (December 2010): 563–87. 
6 Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern 
Enlargement of the European Union,” International Organization 55, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 47–80; Ronald R. 
Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric,” 
European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 1 (March 2007): 35–66. 
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comparatively weaker actors; the United States is rarely the subject of analysis.7 And while 
rhetorical coercion may utilize various forms of discourse, the importance of international 
law as a distinctive—and distinctly potent—form of claim-making has received less 
attention. I focus on the legalised nature of rhetorical entrapment and its impact and 
distinguish this mechanism from other potential explanations like material coercion or 
persuasion. Yet this study deviates from the most common approach to evaluating norm 
progress via the ratification of or accession to a multilateral treaty.8 Despite its refusal to join 
the MBT, the treaty has served as a key reference point against which US policy has been 
justified and assessed. This article thus offers a detailed account of how processes of 
stigmatization surrounding global norms can shape the behavior of even non-member states. 
Theoretically, I argue that international legal practices constitute the necessary shared 
social setting to enable rhetorical action at the international level and specifically against a 
preeminent power like the United States. The US is deeply embedded in the international 
legal order and has a comparatively strong record of adherence to international rules and 
norms. Its hegemonic position is sustained by legitimacy rather than brute coercion which 
leaves it vulnerable to forms of social pressure based on widely accepted international 
standards. US warfare is characterized by its extensive legalization and emphasis on 
technological supremacy and US officials are sensitive to criticism concerning their uses of 
armed force.9 The US’s prior acceptance of (most) international legal restraints on warfare 
thus provides a range of discursive resources for interrogating and challenging its policies. 
                                               
7 An important exception is Kathryn Sikkink, “The United States and Torture: Does the Spiral Model 
Work?,” in The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance, ed. Thomas Risse, 
Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 145–63. 
8 Giovanni Mantilla, “Conforming Instrumentalists: Why the USA and the United Kingdom Joined the 
1949 Geneva Conventions,” European Journal of International Law 28, no. 2 (May 2017): 483–511; Petrova, 
“Rhetorical Entrapment and Normative Enticement.” 
9 Stephanie Carvin and Michael John Williams, Law, Science, Liberalism and the American Way of 
Warfare: The Quest for Humanity in Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Laura A. 
Dickinson, “Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International Law Compliance,” The 
American Journal of International Law 104, no. 1 (January 2010): 1–28; Janina Dill, Legitimate Targets?: 
Social Construction, International Law and US Bombing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); 
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Previous studies have provided a rich description of the US’s ambivalent role in the 
emergence of the AP mine ban but there has been little attention to subsequent 
developments.10 I draw on a wealth of empirical evidence—including public statements, 
reports, archival documents, and in-depth expert interviews—to show how civil society and 
domestic political actors maneuvered the US onto their favored rhetorical terrain through the 
deployment of factual and normative claims. Successive US administrations, both 
Democratic and Republican, have endorsed the humanitarian objectives of the mine ban 
while at the same time asserting the enduring value of AP mines. US responses were not the 
result of a conscious effort to bind itself—as would be envisioned by a notion of “self-
entrapment”—but rather a tactical response to external pressure. Pro-ban advocates have 
exploited these rhetorical tensions, generating additional responses from US officials that 
progressively narrowed the public justifications for AP mines. The declining relevance of AP 
mines in US doctrine is therefore not simply the result of an exogenous change in material 
conditions but can only be understood in the context of a fundamental shift in international 
social expectations that elevated humanitarian considerations in the assessment of the 
weapons’ utility, leading to a revised cost-benefit calculation. I further identify domestic 
institutional adaptation as a key mechanism for transmitting rhetorical entrapment into policy 
outcomes. US discursive commitments prompted a search for alternative technologies to 
replace AP mines and stimulated changes to domestic legislation, bureaucratic structures, and 
military doctrine and procurement that together have greatly diminished the practical role of 
AP mines in US warfare.  
                                               
Fernando G. Nuñez-Mietz, “Lawyering Compliance with International Law: Legal Advisers in the ‘War on 
Terror,’” European Journal of International Security 1, no. 2 (July 2016): 215–38. 
10 Kenneth Rutherford, “The Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention: A Non-Hegemonic Regime,” 
in Cooperating Without America: Theories and Case Studies of Non-Hegemonic Regimes, ed. Stefan Brem and 
Kendall Stiles (New York: Routledge, 2009), 123–46; Leon V. Sigal, Negotiating Minefields: The Landmines 
Ban in American Politics (New York: Routledge, 2006); Mary Wareham, “Rhetoric and Policy Realities in the 
United States,” in To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines ed. Maxwell A. Cameron, 
Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), 212–47. 
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I develop my argument in five steps. I first describe the puzzle animating this study. I 
then develop my theoretical account concerning rhetorical entrapment and US power and 
explain the research design. In the third part I apply the argument to a detailed case study of 
US interaction with the mine ban movement since the early 1990s. The fourth part extends 
the analysis to assess the prospects for US antipersonnel mine policy under the current Trump 
administration. President Trump is upending conventional foreign policy wisdom and has 
alienated the United States from its historic commitments to a liberal international order.11 
His administration would therefore seem an especially unlikely target for rhetorical 
entrapment. Yet I argue that current US accommodation is likely to endure despite the 
antipathy of the current president as the manner by which AP mines have been marginalized 
in US military plans provides a source of policy stability. I conclude by briefly considering 
the broader implications of the present case for rhetorical entrapment in global politics. 
 
US HEGEMONY AND MULTILATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE 
Antipersonnel mines were, until very recently, among the most pervasive weapons in modern 
warfare.12 During the latter half of the 20th Century the weapons were employed by state and 
non-state actors alike in virtually every conflict around the globe, with tens of millions of 
mines directly causing thousands of deaths and tens of thousands of casualties annually.13 In 
recognition of this widespread humanitarian crisis, in the early 1990s a global civil society 
                                               
11 Robert Jervis et al., eds., Chaos in the Liberal Order: The Trump Presidency and International 
Politics in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018); Harold Hongju Koh, The 
Trump Administration and International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
12 Antipersonnel mines are small explosive devices “designed to be placed under, on or near the ground 
or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person.” Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 
September 18, 1997, para. 2.1, http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. 
13 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 1999 (New York: Human Rights 
Watch, 1999), 13, http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pqs_report=&pqs_sect
ion=. For an overview of the historical uses of AP mines see Mike Croll, The History of Landmines (Barnsley: 
Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 1998). 
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movement joined forces with sympathetic states to pursue a comprehensive prohibition on 
the weapons.14 The 1997 MBT aims to reverse a permissive international norm that long 
regarded AP mines as unexceptional. The treaty has achieved widespread acceptance with 
164 State Parties at present, yet the United States—along with other military powers like 
China, India, and Russia—refused to join the MBT.15  
This response fits within the broader historical pattern of exceptionalism in US 
foreign policy that is marked by an enduring ambivalence towards international law.16 A 
belief in the US’s distinctive domestic political culture and a recognition of its preeminent 
material and diplomatic capacities has combined to produce an awkward mix of leadership in 
the creation and enforcement of international institutions and efforts to exempt itself from 
these binding restraints through non-participation, reservations, and forms of non-
compliance. Chayes has termed this “selective multilateralism.”17 A sense of America’s 
special role in the world informs an expectation that primacy bestows considerable latitude in 
interpreting and where necessary avoiding institutional restraints.18 Wohlforth thus concludes 
that “American leaders repeatedly promise their people that they will never allow foreigners a 
veto on any action they deem necessary for US interests… the US ignores any rules that get 
in its way.”19  
                                               
14 Kenneth R. Rutherford, Disarming States: The International Movement to Ban Landmines (Santa 
Barbara: Praeger, 2011); Richard Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land 
Mines,” International Organization 52, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 613–644. 
15 The MBT prohibits the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and 
additionally requires member states destroy current stockpiles, clear mine-infested land under their control, and 
aid mine victims. 
16 Michael Ignatieff, ed., American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005); Harold Hongju Koh, “On American Exceptionalism,” Stanford Law Review 55 (May 2003): 1479; 
Michael Byers and Georg Nolte, eds., United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
17 Antonia Chayes, “How American Treaty Behavior Threatens National Security,” International 
Security 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 47. 
18 Krisch argues, for example, that hegemons frequently employ international law to bind other states 
while withholding their consent from initiatives that empower weaker actors or unduly impede their exercise of 
power. Nico Krisch, “International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the 
International Legal Order,” European Journal of International Law 16, no. 3 (June 2005): 399. 
19 Wohlforth, “US Leadership,” 419. 
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This resistance should be especially apparent in matters of national security where 
legal restraints are assumed to hold least sway.20 Sceptics routinely argue that international 
institutions lack independent causal influence either because they are the product of dominant 
distributions of material power or because they merely formalize the existing preferences of 
participating actors.21 Regulations on the means of warfare should therefore follow, rather 
than precede, a weapon’s obsolescence. Yet contrary to a spare materialist argument that 
would regard AP mines as irrelevant, American military leaders have continued to assert their 
importance despite the rapid growth of high-technology weapons—including precision-
targeted munitions and autonomous platforms—that have revolutionized US warfare.22 
Indeed, there is a variety of scenarios in which AP mines could conceivably serve a valuable 
function in America’s ongoing global wars, such as providing perimeter protection for 
isolated forward operating bases or as a pursuit-deterrent for use by special forces teams; 
most notably, US commanders continue to maintain the importance of AP mines in the 
defense of South Korea. The Pentagon remains extremely wary of conceding influence over 
its capabilities to non-governmental organizations and has long regarded the mine ban 
movement as a precedent for eliminating other weapons systems such as cluster munitions.23 
                                               
20 Benjamin A. Valentino, Paul K. Huth, and Sarah Croco, “Covenants without the Sword: 
International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War,” World Politics 58, no. 3 (April 2006): 339–
77. 
21 George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, “Is the Good News about Compliance 
Good News about Cooperation?” International Organization 50, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 379–406; John J. 
Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994-
95): 5–49. 
22 Martin E. Dempsey, “Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the 
Department of Defense,” US House Armed Services Committee (2014), https://www.c-span.org/video/?318133-
1/hearing-fy2015-defense-budget&start=4013, at 1.06.53; John M. Shalikashvili, “Letter from John M. 
Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Hon. Floyd Spence, Chairman, Committee on National 
Security, House of Representatives,” Pub. L. No. Congressional Record, Vol. 141, No. 198-Part II, Committee 
on National Security, House of Representatives (1995), https://www.congress.gov/crec/1995/12/13/CREC-
1995-12-13-bk2.pdf. 
23 Interview with Mary Wareham, Advocacy Director, Arms Division, Human Rights Watch, 
Washington D.C., October 27, 2017. Interview with Peter Herby, former head of the Arms Unit in the Legal 
Division of the International Committee of the Red Cross (1997-2012), Geneva, August 24, 2017. Interview 
with Karl Inderfurth, former US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs (1997-2001), Washington, 
D.C., October 26, 2017. Telephone interview with Mark Perry, author and historian, March 19, 2018. Interview 
with Tim Rieser, foreign policy aide to U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy (1985-present), Washington, D.C., October 
27, 2017. 
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Rather than representing an unproblematic development, therefore, the elimination of AP 
mines poses real costs even for a highly sophisticated military.  
 
RHETORICAL ENTRAPMENT AND US POWER 
How might the United States be influenced by an international institution it formally rejects? 
I contend that one source of constraint can be found in the way that external actors subject 
US policies to ongoing scrutiny, thereby eliciting responses that embed the US within new 
normative discourses and increase pressure for substantive policy change. My account draws 
inspiration from recent discussions that emphasize the strategic use of principled claims to 
achieve policy goals. Constructivists have long contended that actor identities and resulting 
interests are shaped by the broader social setting in which they are situated and as such, 
collective ideas concerning legitimate conduct provide the context for instrumental action. 
Rationality and normativity are thus deeply entwined and cannot be neatly separated 
ontologically or analytically.24 Most notably, Schimmelfennig’s conception of “rhetorical 
action”25 and Krebs and Jackson’s “rhetorical coercion”26 illustrate how norm entrepreneurs 
seek to compel policy changes in a target actor by altering the discursive setting and hence 
the cost-benefit calculations upon which policy judgements are based, and how the targets of 
these efforts may adopt new international norms due to concerted pressure from external 
coercers without internalizing these values through socialization. Despite the differing terms, 
these accounts share the fundamental assumptions of rhetorical entrapment employed here. 
 
 
                                               
24 James D. Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” in 
Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsneas, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: 
SAGE Publications, 2002), 52–72. 
25 Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap.” 
26 Krebs and Jackson, “Twisting Tongues.” 
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Rhetorical entrapment as a discursive contest 
Common to these accounts is the view that actors deploy claims extensively in international 
political life but frequently do not approach these interactions as open-minded interlocutors 
willing to change their views. Instead, they envision a strategic environment in which actors 
compete through the medium of discourse to pursue existing objectives. A cycle of rhetorical 
entrapment begins with a norm-promoting actor (the entrapper) publicly highlighting 
purported inconsistencies between a target’s current behavior and its professed commitment 
to some collective standard. While the alleged deviance may serve as an initial motivation, 
the strategic objective is to draw the target into an ongoing debate and, ultimately, to force 
the target to accede to the rhetorical framing advanced by the entrapper. Successful rhetorical 
entrapment denies the target a “socially sustainable” alternative position that can be defended 
amongst the relevant community and leads the target to more fully align its behavior and 
discourse with the referent norm as a means of avoiding additional reputational costs.27 
Targets of rhetorical coercion have a range of potential responses but often choose to 
make tactical concessions—modifying their discourse and/or undertaking policies that 
represent a partial accommodation to the referent norm—in the hopes of deflecting further 
criticism. For example, the literature on human rights has observed that states often endorse 
international norms without a commensurate intention to observe their behavioral 
requirements.28 Yet opportunistic adaptation is potentially costly even when it is insincere 
since the target must now defend its actions in reference to the dominant standard which  
creates a new set of justifications that can be seized on by an entrapping actor to demand 
                                               
27 Krebs and Jackson, “Twisting Tongues,” 42; Petrova, “Rhetorical Entrapment and Normative 
Enticement,” 387. 
28 Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Thomas Risse, 
Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to 
Compliance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Heather Smith-Cannoy, Insincere Commitments: 
Human Rights Treaties, Abusive States, and Citizen Activism (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 
2012). 
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further change. Instead of foreclosing additional scrutiny, therefore, incompletely adopting 
the language of a norm cedes rhetorical ground to the entrapper and raises the social costs of 
a future reversal.29  
Rhetorical entrapment can be conceptualized as a sub-set of strategic norm 
entrepreneurship that also includes social pressure tactics—such as naming and shaming—
and persuasion that have been extensively studied by IR scholars. As with naming and 
shaming, entrapping actors publicize alleged transgressions and change in a target actor is 
driven by a desire to avoid further social or material punishments. But rhetorical entrapment 
is explicitly iterative, in that the entrapper aims to capitalize on prior commitments to force 
the target into making additional justifications that set the conditions for further pro-norm 
adaptation. And though an entrapper would certainly like to convince the target of the factual 
or moral legitimacy of their claims, genuine persuasion is likely rare in international 
politics.30 What is colloquially referred to as “arguing” often lacks the foundational 
requirement of a good-faith exchange of ideas aimed at achieving a reasoned agreement, as 
posited in Habermasian communicative action theory, or preference-updating in the form of 
learning.31 Rhetorical entrapment, by contrast, does not require that actors internalize the 
norm and assumes only thin socialization in the sense of adopting the language of a norm in 
response to external pressure. The psychological dispositions of individual or collective 
actors are both extremely difficult to determine empirically and unnecessary to explain 
observed changes in actor behavior: neither the beliefs nor sincerity of the actors matter, 
aside from a basic assumption regarding their instrumental response to social conditions.32 
                                               
29 Petrova, “Rhetorical Entrapment and Normative Enticement,” 388; Risse and Sikkink, “The 
Socialization of International Human Rights Norms,” 25–28; Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap,” 65. 
30 Tine Hanrieder, “The False Promise of the Better Argument,” International Theory 3, no. 3 
(September 2011): 390–415; Krebs and Jackson, “Twisting Tongues,” 36. 
31 Harald Müller, “Arguing, Bargaining and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and 
the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 10, no. 3 
(September 2004): 395–435; Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’” 
32 Krebs and Jackson, “Twisting Tongues,” 40–42; Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap,” 66. My 
account thus shares important affinities with other conceptualisations—such as “acculturation”—that consider 
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This account offers a more nuanced conception of norm development envisioned in 
the now-seminal “norm life cycle.”33 Rhetorical entrapment cannot occur outside of a social 
context which provides the source cues for forms of social pressure: an actor that is entirely 
detached from the broader normative environment would not be susceptible to these coercive 
efforts. Consequently, rhetorical entrapment is enabled by the prior—and often partial or 
tentative—adoption of the referent norm or logically connected norms. But rhetorical 
entrapment does not lead to conclusive socialization at a discernible moment, but rather 
points towards the gradual, ambivalent, and frequently incomplete adoption of norms. 
Despite this, meaningful change is still possible absent full internalization, the final stage of 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s influential model. In this respect, rhetorical entrapment adds to 
recent critiques concerning the excessive linearity of early norms research which instead 
regard engagement with norms as contingent and inherently fluid.34  
 
Entrapping America 
How can rhetorical entrapment work to constrain American power? Here I focus on three key 
characteristics of the social setting that serve as scope conditions for my argument, 
concerning the normative structure, agency of entrapping actors, and US embeddedness in 
the international order, in turn. First, while not premised on achieving genuine agreement, 
rhetorical entrapment still requires shared discursive frameworks to enable actors to 
strategically manipulate words: a target can only respond to a coercive rhetorical maneuver if 
there is some common basis for perceiving and evaluating claims. In their important 
                                               
forms of change in weakly socialized actors. Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting 
Human Rights through International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).  
33 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 887–917.  
34 Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann, “Norms under Challenge: Unpacking the Dynamics of 
Norm Robustness,” Journal of Global Security Studies 4, no. 1 (January 2019): 2–17; Antje Wiener, 
Contestation and Constitution of Norms in Global International Relations (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2018). 
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discussion Krebs and Jackson contend that such conditions are largely lacking in the 
international system, due to a relative paucity of communal values and associated rhetorical 
structures. As such, rhetorical action is in their view less common and potent in the 
transnational sphere than in more cohesive domestic or regional settings—like the European 
Union—which feature denser institutionalization and more extensive social ties among 
constituent actors.35  
I think this is too pessimistic, as it overemphasizes the distinction between domestic 
and international environments and minimizes the extent to which international political life 
is constituted by intersubjective understandings. Constructivist IR theorizing has persuasively 
identified international law as a foundational institution through which actors define 
legitimate participants and forms of appropriate conduct in an international social system.36 
Law is both a prominent means of developing shared normative commitments concerning 
status and appropriate behavior and a distinctive type of argumentative practice whose 
rational-legal authority provides a particularly legitimate means of advancing and 
adjudicating claims.37 International law thus enjoys a privileged status in contemporary 
international affairs as the dominant linguistic framework for characterizing forms of action 
and justifying policy choices, and equally provides the means by which other actors can 
assess and potentially challenge these formulations. These discursive structures combine with 
the routinized practices of international diplomacy to dictate what can be said, in what 
                                               
35 Krebs and Jackson, “Twisting Tongues,” 55–56; Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap.” 
36 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional 
Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Christian Reus-Smit, ed., The Politics of 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
37 Martha Finnemore, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a 
Unipole Isn’t All It’s Cracked up to Be,” in International Relations Theory and the Consequences of 
Unipolarity, ed. G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 79–83; Shirley V. Scott, “International Law as Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship 
between International Law and International Politics,” European Journal of International Law 5, no. 1 (January 
1994): 313–25. 
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setting, and to what intended targets and thus provide the necessary social structures to enable 
rhetorical action.38  
Most importantly for present purposes, the body of law regulating the use of armed 
force—variously termed the laws of war or international humanitarian law (IHL)—
establishes collective standards for legitimate conduct in war. IHL is grounded in the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocols, and their antecedents such as the 1868 
St Petersburg Declaration and Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. These sources are 
supplemented by an expanding collection of treaties and customary rules that govern 
particular weapons systems and protect categories of people or objects (such as child soldiers 
and cultural property).39 At core, IHL seeks to limit the harm caused in armed conflict by 
conditioning notions of military necessity on requirements that the means and methods of 
warfare avoid superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering; are able to effectively 
discriminate between legitimate targets of attack and protected non-combatants; and are 
proportionate to the anticipated military advantage to be achieved. Taken collectively, this 
growing body of legal rules and norms provides the basis for assessing the use of armed 
violence by state and non-state actors, while its uneven adoption and internal ambiguities 
leaves considerable space for competing accounts of what the law permits or forbids in 
specific contexts. The legalization of the use of force does not eliminate political 
contestation, therefore, but entails a channeling of rhetorical maneuvers via legal discourse 
and a consequent narrowing of possible claims. In this respect the institutionalization of the 
mine ban norm through a binding multilateral treaty associated diplomatic meetings, an 
Implementation Support Unit which serves as a de-facto secretariat, and extensive civil 
society oversight in the form of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines’ (ICBL) 
                                               
38 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, “International Practices,” International Theory 3, no. 1 
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annual Landmine Monitor report, facilities rhetorical action by clarifying the nature of 
obligations and providing avenues for discursive engagement. 
Successful rhetorical entrapment also requires the agency of entrapping actors who 
can effectively manipulate available discursive frames to shape the strategic social 
environment.40 While actors have considerable discretion in structuring their claims, 
discourse is not infinitely malleable: the requirement of intersubjective acceptance means that 
effective public discourse is confined within the parameters of permissible speech and must 
be attentive to demands of consistency and coherence in order to resonate with an audience.41 
An impressive body of scholarship has detailed how the global mine ban movement led by 
the ICBL and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) leveraged the language of 
international humanitarian law to stigmatize AP mines as intrinsically illegitimate weapons 
due to their indiscriminate and disproportionate effects.42 This involved challenging the 
dominant understanding of military utility by subjecting state claims concerning the value of 
AP mines to a new humanitarian standard that privileged human suffering, thereby reversing 
the burden of proof under which the weapons are justified. As one senior ICBL leader 
acknowledged “We’ve never said [that AP mines have no military value]. We’ve always said 
that the humanitarian impact of antipersonnel mines far outweighs their military utility.”43 
The ICBL and ICRC were effective in this effort because they were regarded by the wider 
international community as possessing moral authority due to their humanitarian objectives 
                                               
40 Following Vennesson I define frames as “interpretative structures, embedded in political discourse 
that organise reality and provide meaning of an issue or an event.” Pascal Vennesson, “War under Transnational 
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2014): 31. 
41 Stacie E. Goddard and Ronald R. Krebs, “Rhetoric, Legitimation, and Grand Strategy,” Security 
Studies 24, no. 1 (March 2015): 29; Krebs and Jackson, “Twisting Tongues,” 45.  
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43 Interview with Amelie Chayer, former Acting Director, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 
Geneva, August 22, 2017. 
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and the specialized expertise they had developed in documenting the human scale of the 
global landmines crisis.44  
Research on transnational advocacy has also persuasively shown that social pressure 
is greatly enhanced by robust networks of governmental and non-governmental actors 
working both within and outside the target state.45 In the present case, rhetorical entrapment 
has been driven by a close strategic partnership between the ICBL and its US affiliate 
(USCBL), the ICRC, and a limited number of domestic political elites, most especially 
Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy. Pro-ban advocates strategically engaged US officials on 
their own terms by carefully monitoring US policy pronouncements and “us[ing] their words 
against them whenever we can” to generate conditions for political change.46 This has taken 
two principal forms. On the one hand, entrapping actors intensively interrogated the factual 
basis of US claims concerning the technical features and uses of AP mines in US military 
doctrine. On the other hand, these same advocates have invoked moral considerations and 
US identity by highlighting a purported gap between US commitment to humanitarian values 
and its status as an outsider to the global mine ban.  
As the target of these rhetorical efforts, US leadership in the modern rule-based 
international order renders it particularly liable to claims of hypocrisy when it seeks to 
exempt itself from widely-accepted institutions. Despite its material preponderance US 
hegemony is ultimately premised upon legitimation more than raw coercion and requires the 
collective acceptance of other actors.47 IR scholarship has established that states—to the 
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extent they are envisioned as collective actors—are sensitive to their position within complex 
social hierarchies and seek to enhance their prestige and avoid stigma.48 In broad terms, 
therefore, the more a state is motivated to maintain its status as a member of good standing in 
a community, the greater its vulnerability to rhetorical coercion premised on deviance from 
ostensible collective values.49 Previous studies specifically suggest that democracies by virtue 
of their representative government and openness to civic participation are more susceptible to 
forms of internal and external pressure.50 For example, Erickson has demonstrated how 
democratic states adopted regulations on conventional weapons sales out of concern for their 
domestic and international reputations.51 As already noted, adaptation can be entirely self-
interested, as target actors change their behavior due to the perceived social costs of 
continued non-conformance without any deeper shift in beliefs.  
Embeddedness in a broader normative and legal order thus facilitates rhetorical 
entrapment by providing the shared discursive frames through which esteem and shame are 
instrumentalized. The US has adopted the vast majority of core rules governing the conduct 
of warfare and US political and military leaders alike are highly sensitive to scrutiny 
concerning the behavior of their armed forces. International law thus clearly shapes the way 
the US fights, even in the breach.52 Moreover, US officials regularly publicize their claims 
regarding the appropriate limits of international rules, thus providing rhetorical openings for 
further engagement. As a consequence, the US has been intimately involved in the core 
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debates that animate the AP mine ban, even as it has remained outside of the formal legal 
instrument. Yet successive administrations did not adopt the language of the mine ban as a 
form of deliberate self-entrapment, using public statements to bind current or future domestic 
leaders to the norm. Indeed, the US often interprets—and arguably manipulates—
international legal standards to justify its policies.53 Rather, US responses were defensive and 
reactive, and aimed at subduing external criticism concerning its use of armed force. But 
because international law is a collective social phenomenon, its meanings cannot be 
unilaterally imposed even by a preeminent state. Partial US concessions empowered pro-ban 
actors to further interrogate US claims and thereby lay the groundwork for entrapment. This 
iterative process forced the US to repeatedly justify its policies in reference to an 
international standard which had the effect of endorsing new criteria for evaluating legitimate 
uses of force and raising the standards against which AP mines are judged. 
 
Research design  
Rhetoric is more than mere “cheap talk” that actors deploy without consequence and can 
have real-world effects by shaping meaning and constraining subsequent policy options.54  
I employ process tracing and chart the impact of rhetorical entrapment on US antipersonnel 
mine policy over a period of 25 years spanning four Democratic and Republican 
administrations. I reconstruct the chronology of key rhetorical engagements and link these to 
subsequent changes in US discourse and behavior by drawing on public statements, policy 
documents, NGO reports and letters, archival materials, and in-depth interviews with civil 
society advocates, MBT representatives, and current and former US officials. Process tracing 
is especially valuable for the kind of analysis undertaken here as it is directed towards the 
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“systematic study of the link between an outcome of interest and an explanation based on the 
rigorous assessing and weighting of evidence for and against causal inference”55 and is 
therefore well adapted to addressing the sequencing of events and descriptive complexity 
inherent in a single case study.56 
 For rhetorical entrapment to provide a persuasive explanation it must account for both 
the timing and nature of observed change. US officials adopted the humanitarian discourse 
that acknowledges the particular threat that AP mines pose to civilian populations but 
promoted a particularly American emphasis on technological solutions that at once 
downplayed US responsibility for landmine casualties and sought to carve-out exemptions for 
specific US systems. This ambivalence opened avenues for rhetorical pressure by pro-ban 
advocates which in turn generated further US justifications that reflected the growing 
influence of the stigma. Here the absence of certain speech acts provides powerful evidence 
of norm impact as formerly acceptable claims are removed from public discourse.57 The 
abandonment of references to AP mines as an unexceptional component of US arsenals and 
later, the technological superiority of US landmines, are thus highly consequential 
developments. 
A central contention of this article is that rhetorical concessions do not mark the end 
of an entrapment episode but frequently stimulate processes of formal policy change as new 
discourses come to be embedded in state institutions. Adaptation to norms thus becomes path 
dependent as the acceptance of externally-imposed rhetorical framings shapes behavioral 
choices and capacities that narrow the range of possible future options.58 The acceptance of 
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humanitarian language concerning AP mines has spurred new domestic legislation; changes 
to military doctrine, training, and procurement; and a long-term resource-intensive search for 
alternative technologies to replace AP mines that set the weapons apart as a topic of special 
concern and raised the threshold for their prospective use. The US has not used AP mines 
since the 1991 Gulf War and has committed to destroy its remaining stockpiles despite 
ongoing military operations around the world. These actions have aggregated over time to 
foreclose formerly uncontroversial policy options, rendering reversal more complicated and 
costly. While it is certainly true that “few in the armed services [now deem] landmines to be 
a military requirement,”59 this shift has been driven by the transnational rhetorical strategy 
described below and not a decline in material utility alone. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE ANTIPERSONNEL MINE BAN 
The Clinton administration 
The presidency of Bill Clinton was bookended by the emergence of the global mine ban 
movement in the early 1990s and its successful culmination in the Mine Ban Treaty in 
December 1997. President Clinton appears to have become personally invested in the issue 
and there was considerable sympathy among senior administration officials.60 Faced with a 
growing global movement, “[US officials] always wanted to be seen as doing the right thing 
or at least something, they didn’t want to alienate themselves from what became most of the 
rest of the world… and they were certainly aware of and shared the humanitarian 
concerns.”61 But US land warfare doctrine envisioned the continued use of AP mines, 
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primarily as part of integrated antivehicle systems.62 Antipersonnel mines had been used 
extensively in the recent 1991 Gulf War and were regarded by senior officers as an 
“indispensable component” of the successful ground invasion.63 Clinton’s fraught 
relationship with the military—stemming from his avoidance of the draft in Vietnam and 
policy regarding gay servicemembers—left the President unwilling to challenge the senior 
leadership over AP mines.64 From the outset, therefore, the administration attempted to strike 
a delicate compromise between the President’s purported humanitarian ideals and military 
demands, which provided rich terrain for rhetorical contest. 
 Early on the ICBL and USCBL established close relations with Senator Leahy to 
coordinate pressure on the new administration.65 Leahy’s leadership produced a number of 
domestic legislative developments, notably a temporary export moratorium—subsequently 
renewed and made permanent in 1997—and a one-year suspension of US mine use. While 
individually modest, these efforts forced the administration to confront the AP mine issue and 
began the process of denormalizing the weapons in US discourse. As anticipated in the 
theoretical account, exposure to the emerging mine ban norm stimulated bureaucratic 
responses: the Department of State established an Interagency Working Group on Demining 
and Landmine Control, initiated an intensive landmine policy review, and commissioned an 
annual report entitled Hidden Killers, the first systematic governmental study of the global 
AP mine crisis.66 While not committing the US to any particular course of action, these 
processes elevated the profile of AP mines in future policy discussions. 
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As the sole remaining superpower, the US sought to exert leadership over the nascent 
international discussions regarding landmines in order to shape the process to favor US 
interests. In 1993 the United States sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution (introduced 
by Leahy) calling for a global moratorium on the export and trade in AP mines67 but 
abstained on a parallel resolution seeking a review of existing international legal constraints 
on conventional weapons, which the Pentagon feared would lead to a global ban.68 The most 
significant development in this early period was Clinton’s 1994 UNGA speech in which he 
called for “the eventual elimination” of AP mines, a phrase that was reportedly included after 
intensive lobbying from Senator Leahy and his staff.69 Yet the US made clear that it did not 
back such an initiative under present circumstances, and instead sought support for a control 
regime that would restrict the legitimate uses of the weapons. US officials adopted a strategic 
framing which downplayed US responsibility for the global humanitarian mine crisis and 
emphasized the technological superiority of US weapons. In particular, the US claimed that 
its “smart” AP mines equipped with self-destructing or self-deactivating capabilities 
eliminated the threat to civilian populations posed by “dumb” or persistent mines used by 
most states and armed groups. 
Clinton’s statement provided a rhetorical opening that was immediately seized on by 
advocates, initiating the twin technical and legal categories that have typified the US 
landmines issue ever since. NGOs engaged officials in detailed debates concerning the nature 
                                               
67 United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution 48/75K: Moratorium on the Export of Anti-
Personnel Land-Mines,” Pub. L. No. A/RES/48/75K (1993), para. 2, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/48/75; Rutherford, Disarming States, 45–47. 
68 United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution 48/79: Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or To Have 
Indiscriminate Effects,” Pub. L. No. A/RES/48/79 (1993), 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/48/79; Parlow, “Banning Land Mines,” 725; 
Rutherford, Disarming States, 45–49. 
69 William J. Clinton, “Remarks to the 49th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New 
York City” (United Nations General Assembly, Forty-ninth session, New York, September 26, 1994), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=49152&st=united+nations&st1; Sigal, Negotiating 
Minefields, 47–51; Wareham, “Rhetoric and Policy Realities,” 220–21. 
 23 
and implications of US antipersonnel mine doctrine. The ICRC commissioned detailed 
studies of past landmine use authored by retired senior military officers that were “quite 
influential in… forcing armed forces to look at” the issue.70 In response, the Department of 
Defense contracted outside experts to undertake a systematic study of the uses of AP mines71 
and initiated its own internal landmine policy review which ultimately determined that AP 
mines remained a valuable component of existing operational plans – a decision that was 
reportedly based on the sole insistence of the commander responsible for Korea.72 At the 
same time, the Pentagon was forced to respond to domestic legislative developments by 
publicly articulating the conditions for its continued retention of AP mines: “smart” 
landmines were needed for specific security scenarios and deployed in in conformance with 
all current requirements of IHL; yet the military leadership also supported the long-term 
objective of a global mine ban.73  
This increased engagement enabled further scrutiny. The 1994 DoD report concluded 
that antivehicle mines retained defensive utility but that AP mines were less valuable in high-
mobility warfare and consequently “may warrant first consideration” in future arms control, a 
point that was seized upon by the ICBL.74 A 1997 report by Human Rights Watch and the 
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation drew on the experiences of US soldiers in Korea 
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and Vietnam to counter the idea that there was unanimity within the US military regarding 
the efficacy of AP mines.75 In parallel, the ICBL organized a series of letters signed by 
retired senior US military officers—including notable figures like General Norman 
Schwarzkopf and former Commander of US Forces in Korea General James Hollingsworth—
supporting US participation in a global mine ban that sought to bolster Clinton against 
criticism from within the military and conservative political circles.  
These pressure tactics forced the administration to respond with new public 
justifications. Presidential Decision Directive 48 (PDD 48) acknowledged “the growing 
threat posed by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines” and committed the US to 
“aggressively pursue” a comprehensive ban provided that “essential U.S. military 
requirements and commitments to our allies will be protected.”76 PDD 48 then articulated the 
three core features of a revised US policy. First, the US would abandon “dumb” persistent 
mines and henceforth rely solely on “smart” mines. Second, PDD 48 emphasized the “the 
security situation on the Korean Peninsula as a unique case” and linked US participation in a 
global AP mine ban to the successful resolution of security concerns there.77 Finally, the 
document directed the Department of Defense “to undertake a program of research, 
procurement and other measures needed to eliminate the requirement for these exceptions 
and to permit both the United States and its allies to end reliance on [AP mines] as soon as 
possible.”78 While initially designed to delay a decision concerning the nascent AP mine ban, 
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this search for alternative technologies set rhetorical conditions that interacted with evolving 
conceptions of military utility to constrain US weapons procurement policy going forward.79 
The announcement drew the immediate ire of civil society who publicly opposed the 
US effort to retain—even temporarily—AP mines and led to renewed efforts to push for a 
global ban with or without US participation. Two parallel tracks thus emerged in diplomatic 
responses to AP mines. The US initially pursued a revised control regime at the 1995-1996 
Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons which led to the 
agreement of Amended Protocol II (APII).80 APII permits the continued use of AP mines 
provided they contain sufficient metallic content to be detectable and are deployed either in 
fenced minefields or are equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms. The 
ICBL excoriated the outcome as a “deplorable failure” and abdication of US leadership 
whose complexity and emphasis on technological fixes was, in the words of one ICRC 
representative, “woefully inadequate” to address the humanitarian threat posed by AP 
mines.81 The perceived limitations of APII gave additional impetus to efforts by civil society 
and a “core group” of like-minded states to establish a separate diplomatic process explicitly 
directed towards the conclusion of a global AP mine ban bypassing US leadership.  
The dynamics of rhetorical entrapment help illuminate both the process and outcome 
of the negotiations that have been described in detail elsewhere.82 Petrova has argued that 
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“[m]oving negotiations to a stand-alone process for those favoring the establishment of new 
norms tilts the balance in favor of norm proponents, delimits the scope of legitimate 
arguments, and creates the conditions for rhetorical entrapment of opponents.”83 The decision 
by pro-ban states to limit participation at the Brussels and Oslo negotiating meetings to those 
states that endorsed the objectives of a comprehensive prohibition was thus critically 
important as it maintained an image of cohesion and limited the scope of possible US claims. 
The discursive terrain of IHL and ongoing technical debates heavily structured both the 
iterative US proposals and the opposition from other state and NGO participants. US 
negotiators sought to carve-out exemptions for US mines through a set of connected demands 
presented as non-negotiable “red-lines.” These faced intense resistance forcing US officials 
to abandon some aspects—notably a specific geographic exception for Korea and withdrawal 
and reservations provisions—and offer a new position that insisted on a nine-year delay on 
the treaty’s entry into force to allow for alternative technologies and a revised definition that 
effectively excluded US antipersonnel mines deployed as “anti-handling devices” integrated 
with antivehicle mines (the latter of which are not encompassed in the ban).84 By this point, 
however, the ascendant humanitarian frame emphasizing discrimination and proportionality 
had become the dominant lens for assessing the legitimacy of AP mines among the majority 
of states who rejected the US position as inadequate. The Clinton administration remained 
deeply skeptical about the wisdom of a binding prohibition and assumed that it could 
effectively shape the outcome through aggressive negotiating tactics; yet the US substantially 
underestimated the shift in international opinion and was unprepared for the speed and 
determination of the resulting diplomacy. 
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In the aftermath of the US’s diplomatic failure, President Clinton justified the 
decision not to join the MBT by referencing “unique” US global security commitments and 
again specifically identifying Korea and integrated antipersonnel-antivehicle mines as the 
primary impediments.85 During the same statement, Clinton also announced a series of 
additional policy steps by which the US would “develop alternatives to antipersonnel land 
mines;” end the use of all AP mines by 2003 (and by 2006 for Korea) if suitable alternatives 
were found; seek further negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament; and substantially 
increase its funding for humanitarian demining around the world.86 These commitments were 
formalized in Presidential Decision Directive 64 of June 1998 which further promised that 
the US would join the MBT by 2006 if existing AP mines could be replaced by new 
systems.87 
At the moment of maximum geopolitical advantage, the United States failed to 
decisively shape the course of a major international security institution, in large part because 
it had been successfully boxed-in to a set of discursive positions that it did not fully control. 
The US refusal to join thus cast it as an outlier in an international community that had rapidly 
changed its normative orientation on this issue. As Human Rights Watch asserted, “the 
president has ceded leadership and abdicated responsibility on a crucial humanitarian issue 
that he in no small part personally brought to the attention of the rest of the world.”88 
 
The Bush administration 
When President Bush took office in January 2001 he inherited a policy which, while falling 
short of full endorsement of the mine ban norm, did institutionalize the language of AP mines 
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as a global humanitarian problem. This discursive framing constituted a form of rhetorical 
path dependence that continued to inform US policymaking on the issue and limited the 
range of acceptable arguments. While the administration was often characterized as hostile to 
international legal constraints, the AP mine ban was not a subject of particular ire: President 
Bush was not personally interested in the issue as his predecessor had been, and the 
administration’s most hardline anti-internationalist voices were less involved in discussions 
as compared with other institutions like the International Criminal Court.89 Yet opportunities 
for rhetorical entrapment were hindered by a lack of extensive engagement that characterized 
the Clinton years as the US stopped attending Mine Ban Treaty meetings as an observer.  
Other pathways endured, however, with the rhetorical contest particularly defined by 
technical debates over the nature and operation of US mines. The terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001 intensified questions about the future use of US military power while the 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq presented new opportunities for AP mine use. Early on the 
new administration created the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement within the 
Department of State that consolidated bureaucratic policymaking concerning landmines and 
initiated a landmine policy review involving the National Security Council and Departments 
of Defense and State. The DoD commissioned expert reports that examined the historical use 
of AP mines, their prospective role in contemporary US warfighting, and the prospects for 
alternative technologies to replace AP mines in US military doctrine. These studies 
concluded that AP mines remained highly valuable when deployed as part of antivehicle 
minefields, that no other existing technologies fully replaced AP mines without substantially 
increasing the size of a defending force, and that eliminating AP mines “could lead to higher 
casualties to our ground forces and/or could reduce our military capabilities.”90 
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 Pro-ban actors attempted to shape the ongoing policy review by directly challenging 
the premises of the US position. Supporters of the mine ban in the US Congress 
commissioned their own report into the US use of AP mines in the 1991 Gulf War which 
raised concerns about casualties to friendly forces and impediments to US high-mobility 
warfare and rejected claims that AP mines had been decisive in that conflict.91 This forced a 
response from the Pentagon that sought to rebut the specific assessments by detailing a series 
of initiatives aimed at improving the reliability of existing landmine systems and developing 
alternative technologies.92 Retired military officers were once again recruited to challenge the 
stated justifications for retaining AP mines in the defense of Korea.93 Finally, much of the 
debate again revolved around administration assertions that their smart mines were 
“extremely reliable” and nearly eliminated the humanitarian threat posed by US devices.94 
The ICBL and ICRC drew on detailed technical studies from military and landmine clearance 
experts which disputed the ostensible importance of AP mines in integrated antivehicle 
systems and found that the self-destructing and self-deactivating technologies had much 
higher failure rates than US officials suggested.95 In parallel, the ICBL and USCBL 
continued their advocacy efforts by arranging meetings between mine ban advocates and 
members of Congress as well as senior administration officials and coordinating extensive 
publicity efforts including letter-writing campaigns, newspaper editorials, and advertisements 
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in radio, television, print, and public spaces that highlighted US moral leadership in 
addressing the humanitarian impact of AP mines. The ICBL and members of Congress led by 
Senator Leahy also publicly and privately pressed the administration to refrain from using AP 
mines in military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.96  
In February 2004 the administration unveiled its new landmine policy which it 
characterized as a “significant departure from past approaches” that would more effectively 
address the underlying causes of the global humanitarian crisis.97 The Bush policy sought to 
reframe the international debate by treating all landmines—both antipersonnel and 
antivehicle—as part of the same broader problem where the weapons’ persistence, and not 
their inability to discriminate between soldiers and non-combatants, was the ultimate source 
of unacceptable humanitarian harm. The administration thus expanded upon the Clinton-era 
effort to exclude US uses of AP mines from censure by blaming “unprofessional, untrained 
and undisciplined militant groups” for using landmines in ways that contravened existing 
legal restrictions found in Amended Protocol II.98 The Bush policy reinforced the US 
preference for technological solutions by committing the US to eliminate all non-self-
destructing and non-self-deactivating mines by 2010, seek a binding global ban on export of 
non-self-destructing mines, and increase US funding for humanitarian mine action by 50%.99 
Moreover, the policy was unconditional—unlike Clinton’s—and contained no geographic 
exemption for Korea or anywhere else.100 US officials explicitly positioned the 2004 policy 
as an improvement over the MBT which was said to suffer from an “absolutist, abolitionist 
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and overly idealistic approach” that did not address the entirety of the humanitarian challenge 
or respect the legitimate military requirements of the US and other non-parties.101 
While the 2004 announcement was a profound disappointment to mine ban advocates, 
it reiterated and further embedded the humanitarian language concerning AP mines as a 
baseline against which US actions could be assessed. In the broader political context, US 
efforts to legitimize “smart” self-destruction and self-deactivation technologies were again 
rejected by other states who had little enthusiasm for recognizing exceptions to a global 
prohibition on AP mines or endorsing US technical superiority, as had been the case with the 
Clinton administration’s failed efforts to shape the MBT negotiations. In other words, US 
diplomacy yet again failed to alter the underlying “rhetorical commonplaces” so as to gain 
endorsement for its preferred framing. 
While the administration insisted upon the utility of its AP mines, therefore, in 
practice the continued denormalization of the weapons served to further raise the threshold 
for their future use. Under the 2004 policy the use of persistent “dumb” mines could only 
occur with explicit Presidential authorization, while the use of “smart” mines would normally 
require approval from the Secretary of Defense or a delegated subordinate – a standard not 
applied to other conventional weapons.102 The successful international resistance to US 
reframing also influenced domestic political debates in the Congress which had material 
consequences for military procurement. The two main proposed alternatives to AP mines—
the XM-7 Spider and Intelligent Munition System (IMS)—were initially designed to include 
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an autonomous victim-activation mode that would have violated the terms of the MBT.103 In 
the face of public opposition from the ICBL, the US Congress sought to restrict funding for 
research and development into systems that contravened the MBT and required the Army to 
examine the humanitarian impact of the proposed systems, leading to the abandonment of 
victim-activation in the Spider system, elimination of an antipersonnel function altogether in 
IMS, and the cancellation of the mixed antipersonnel-antivehicle RADAM system.104 Other 
systems—notably Matrix which was deployed to Iraq in 2005—were also developed solely in 
a command-detonated “soldier-in-the-loop” configuration.105 
Finally, the wider normative stigma undoubtedly informed the decision not to deploy 
AP mines with US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. As one senior State Department official 
recalls “I told [US CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks in late 2001] that the 
world knew that the Shomali Plain was one of the most mine-affected areas on the planet and 
that it would not go unnoticed if the United States military in trying to save Afghanistan 
actually brought more land mines to Afghanistan.”106 The cumulative effect of these policies 
was to effectively remove AP mines from the menu of options: 
if we don't use landmines… the US military gets used to deploying which they 
certainly did in Afghanistan and then Iraq without bringing land mines as part 
of their war fighting kit… a time would come when junior officers became 
senior officers and their logistic teams, and their acquisition teams would have 
no memory of ever using landmines. It was simply atrophy and not being part 
of the military culture.107  
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As would be expected, rhetorical maneuvering did not succeed in convincing either side of 
the substantive merits of their interlocutor’s position. Yet the political impact was 
considerable, as it forced the US government and military to repeatedly justify their existing 
policy, rather than treating AP mines as unproblematic. Rhetorical entrapment did not change 
minds within the administration, therefore, but the concerted pressure did meaningfully shape 
the trajectory of US policy, leading to a further eight years where AP mines did not feature in 
US warfighting. 
 
The Obama administration 
The inauguration of President Barack Obama was widely hailed as a marking a renewed US 
commitment to multilateralism. During his time in the Senate Obama cosponsored Senator 
Leahy’s bill that would have prohibited US antipersonnel mine development and as 
President-elect had expressed his “[strong] support [for] international initiatives to limit harm 
to civilians caused by conventional weapons.”108 President Obama was reportedly personally 
invested in the issue and other senior officials—notably National Security Council adviser 
Samantha Power and State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh—were believed to support 
US ratification.109 This increased engagement generated renewed impetus among civil society 
advocates who regarded the MBT as a symbolic way for the Obama administration to “show 
a new face to the world.”110  
 The comparative sensitivity of the new administration to external critique enhanced 
the prospects of rhetorical entrapment. This was evident early on, when the administration 
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initially announced in November 2009 that it would retain the Bush-era landmine policy. 
This cursory decision elicited an immediate and vehement response from the ICBL and 
Senator Leahy.111 The force of the criticism caught Obama officials off guard and resulted in 
a public reversal the next day and the initiation of a much more substantial policy review.112 
A senior State Department official characterized this as a serious, whole-of-government 
process that involved extensive discussions with NGOs, diplomats, and Senator Leahy’s 
office.113 The administration was explicit in its endorsement of the “humanitarian goals” of 
the AP mine ban and was adamant that the objective of the review was “not simply to 
reassess the current utility of our non-persistent mine systems for certain mission 
requirements, but to specifically examine the costs and benefits that would be involved in a 
decision to accede to the [Mine Ban] Treaty.”114 While administration officials recognized 
the reputational gains from endorsing the AP mine ban, they faced enduring opposition from 
the senior military leadership. The policy review thus focused on evaluating the viability of 
alternative weapons systems that could replace AP mines in operational plans for the defense 
of Korea.115   
Pro-norm actors deliberately leveraged the administration’s desire to be seen as 
proactive participants in the international humanitarian effort and effectively instrumentalized 
shame and inclusion through extensive op-eds, letter-writing campaigns, and in-person 
meetings targeting administration officials and US diplomats posted to mine-affected and 
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pro-ban countries.116 The ICBL and USCBL made regular reference to President Clinton’s 
1994 UNGA speech calling for an eventual ban on AP mines and solicited a letter from 
fellow Nobel Prize laureates urging President Obama to join the Mine Ban Treaty.117 Senator 
Leahy organized a letter from 68 Senators—along with a parallel letter from members of the 
House of Representatives—that appealed to Obama as a former colleague and advocated 
prompt ratification of the MBT by specifically engaging with stated official reasons for not 
joining the treaty.118 After the US condemned the Syrian government for using AP mines, 
Human Rights Watch (which chairs the ICBL) called on the Obama administration to act on 
its criticism by joining the mine ban itself.119 In parallel, the ICBL and USCBL utilized their 
position of expertise to bolster pro-ban members of the administration by providing 
information concerning US landmine doctrine and alternatives.120 
As an interim measure, the US began sending an official observer delegation to MBT 
meetings for the first time since the Clinton administration, a move that was intended to 
signal that “[t]he Administration is strongly committed to continued U.S. global leadership in 
eliminating the humanitarian risks posed by landmines.”121 MBT officials described this as “a 
huge step” that showed the US was “part of this community of states, even though [they] are 
not party to the instrument.”122 Beyond the symbolism, the meetings offered an important 
venue for rhetorical entrapment. Of particular importance were private ICBL-organized 
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meetings between members of the US delegation and landmine survivors—particularly from 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and South East Asia—who spoke about their traumas and urged the US to 
commit fully to the mine ban. This helped generate and then maintain political commitment 
within the bureaucracy by making US officials accountable to affected communities: “people 
who represent the United States in those meetings… have to write reports back to their 
superiors…. It shows that the pressure is still on. Civil society is not giving up.”123 
 In 2014 the Obama administration issued two policy updates that brought the US into 
closer alignment with the MBT. In June the US committed not to “produce or otherwise 
acquire any anti-personnel munitions that are not compliant with the Ottawa Convention in 
the future…. Meanwhile, we are diligently pursuing other solutions that would be compliant 
with the Convention and that would ultimately allow us to accede to the Convention.”124 The 
timing of this announcement at the Third MBT Review Conference was significant, as the 
ICBL had identified this meeting as a focal point for pressuring the Obama administration to 
finalize their policy review.125 A former ICBL official recalls that US diplomats had 
anticipated campaigner concerns and came ready to explain the policy and its potential future 
trajectory.126 In one telling detail, the US admitted that its forces had used a single AP mine 
during the war in Afghanistan.127 The fact that an MBT non-party felt compelled to 
acknowledge a minor transgression of a treaty for which it had no legal obligations is further 
evidence of the extent of the global stigma concerning the weapons. In private, US officials 
reportedly expressed “how horribly they felt about it…. [T]hey felt they had to come clean 
                                               
123 Chayer interview. 
124 United States of America, “Statement by Ambassador Griffiths.” 
125 Wareham interview. 
126 Interview with former member of ICBL staff. 
127 Department of State, United States of America, “Daily Press Briefing with Marie Harf,” June 27, 
2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/06/228539.htm#MISCELLANEOUS. Reportedly this was a 
pursuit-deterrent mine deployed by US special forces; Wareham interview. 
 37 
and acknowledge that as part of their whole process…. That fear of being found out and for 
an NGO to publish that rather than them was why they came clean.”128 
The June statement made clear that “[o]ther aspects of our landmine policy remain 
under consideration.”129 This offered renewed impetus for the ICBL and others to push the 
US for full adherence.130 In September 2014 the US committed to “not use [AP mines] 
outside the Korean Peninsula; not assist, encourage, or induce anyone outside the Korean 
Peninsula to engage in activity prohibited by the Ottawa Convention; and undertake to 
destroy [AP mine] stockpiles not required for the defense of the Republic of Korea” and 
reaffirmed its position as the leading funder of humanitarian mine action globally.131 
Significantly, President Obama made this announcement in a speech at the Clinton Global 
Initiative that directly referenced President Clinton’s 1994 call for an eventual ban on AP 
mines and the decisive leadership of the ICBL and Senator Leahy.132 According to some 
NGO leaders, Obama deliberately selected this venue and framing as a way to “close the 
circle… and complete the work that Clinton began 20 years ago.”133  
The 2014 landmine policy represents a negotiated compromise between an 
administration that was sensitive to international normative appeals and senior military 
leadership that continued to regard AP mines as an “important tool in the arsenal of the 
United States” in light of increasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula.134 Korea has therefore 
served as a “trump card” for the military to oppose the mine ban as more specific technical 
justifications have lost salience.135 But while concerted pressure from domestic and 
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transnational advocates was ultimately unable to overcome this intractable issue, rhetorical 
entrapment stimulated successive policy changes that have further marginalized AP mines in 
US national security policy. The Obama administration notably abandoned the previous 
language concerning US “smart” mines and the 2014 announcements renewed US 
commitments to technological solutions through “a high fidelity modeling and simulation 
effort to ascertain how to mitigate the risks associated with the loss of anti-personnel 
landmines.”136 At the same time, existing AP mine stockpiles are being withdrawn or will 
soon enter obsolesce: all persistent antivehicle and antipersonnel mines were destroyed in 
2010, while the 2014 policy bars the US from extending the operational life of current self-
destructing mines by replacing their batteries.  
Removing AP mines from the regular military toolkit has further reinforced the 
exceptional status of the weapons. As one US Congressional official put it, despite official 
protestations to the contrary 
I think [the Pentagon] realized that the arguments that they had been making for 
years just didn’t hold up any longer. They hadn’t used [AP mines] for twenty 
years, and they knew that if they did, they would be severely criticized…. [I]t 
would be politically very damaging…. As long as they could use AP mines in 
Korea, that was what they said they cared about.137 
 
Despite this shift, the current Department of Defense Law of War Manual declares that the 
MBT’s “prohibitions do not reflect customary international law” and US adaptation remains 
the product of pressure rather than wholesale persuasion.138  
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CODA: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND THE FUTURE OF US 
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE POLICY 
The presidency of Donald Trump has called into question many of the fundamental features 
of US foreign policy. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether informal US observance of the 
mine ban norm can survive contact with an administration that has demonstrated itself to be 
especially hostile to international restraints. Indeed, policy changes based on cost-benefit 
calculations rather than norm internalization are more vulnerable to reversal should the target 
no longer respond to opprobrium and praise as before. And President Trump and his advisors 
are clearly not susceptible to stigmatization on the basis of “liberal” norms as his 
predecessors have been.  
Yet I contend that the path dependencies generated by rhetorical entrapment point 
towards sources of policy stability that will likely endure even as President Trump seeks to 
undo the Obama administration’s legacy in other areas. While the 2014 policy was enacted 
via a presidential announcement that may be reversed, other facets of US landmine policy 
(such as legislative moratoria) are outside the purview of the executive branch while re-
integrating AP mines into military arsenals would require costly commitments with respect to 
research, production, procurement, and training. The diffuse nature of institutional adaptation 
has increased the military, political, and diplomatic veto points to policy change while the 
diminishment of AP mines in US security policy has greatly reduced the constituencies that 
might agitate for a revival of this capacity.139 At the same time, the international stigma has 
not abated; according to one mine ban official, therefore, “we don't expect the US to be using 
[antipersonnel mines] again, or producing or transferring…. I don’t believe they would stoop 
that low.”140  
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In this light, it is significant that the Trump administration has not formally 
announced any intention to conduct a policy review and has continued its predecessor’s 
engagement with the mine ban including by sending observer delegations to recent MBT 
meetings.141 US funding for humanitarian demining appears to have remained stable—and 
even increased in 2017—despite dramatic cuts proposed to State Department budgets in other 
areas.142 US officials continue to call for “a robust international partnership with the shared 
goal of reducing the impact of landmines around the world” while avoiding references to the 
2014 Obama policy.143 Tellingly, there has not been any resurgence of claims concerning the 
necessity of AP mines as recently experienced with cluster munitions.144  
Thus far, the AP mine ban has not caught the attention of an administration well 
known for its belligerent approach to foreign policy. Given President Trump’s antipathy to 
other international commitments, many advocates of the mine ban have deliberately avoided 
forms of public and private engagement with the administration. A senior member of Human 
Rights Watch explains that “[w]e look like we’re inactive, but we’re scared of writing letters, 
making proposals, op-eds, direct contact with Trump administration advising them to do 
something on some policy issue because we’re worried they’re going to do the exact opposite 
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if it comes from [us].”145 Ironically, therefore, in the present moment the most effective way 




This article shows how rhetorical entrapment can work to constrain even a predominantly 
powerful state in the challenging conditions of national security politics, and where the target 
remains outside the relevant legal agreement. Rather than a top-down process initiated by 
senior officials, US engagement with the mine ban movement was precipitated by intensive 
advocacy from transnational civil society and a limited number of US political elites. These 
actors strategically leveraged America’s preeminent position to emphasize its disconnect 
from a broad-based international moral movement. This mobilization of factual and 
normative claims provoked a range of incremental responses that in turn enabled further 
scrutiny. Successive administrations have refused to endorse the AP mine ban in its entirety, 
but notably failed to generate international acceptance of their preferred alternative framings. 
The evolution of US antipersonnel mine policy is therefore best understood not as a 
straightforward adaptation to changed material conditions but rather a response to 
coordinated social pressure that altered underlying cost-benefit calculations and pushed the 
leading military power to gradually and at times reluctantly align its policy with its stated 
ambitions. These concessions have compounded over time to almost completely remove AP 
mines from American warfighting plans. 
To the extent that rhetorical entrapment can explain policy change in this hard case, it 
is reasonable to assume that the theoretical mechanism would operate in other contexts as 
well. To conclude, I briefly sketch a research agenda for studying the process and impact of 
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stigmatizing treaty non-members based on the scope conditions identified above. First, more 
could be said about the targets of rhetorical entrapment. I have argued that the US’s status as 
a liberal hegemon makes it a particular target for allegations of bad conduct. Yet even 
authoritarian and illiberal regimes can face social costs from transgressing widely-accepted 
international norms. Interestingly, other prominent MBT non-parties like China and Russia 
have demonstrated sensitivity to the mine ban norm by endorsing the spirit of a global 
prohibition, adhering to many provisions, and, in the case of Russia, concealing alleged 
violations.146 A useful first step would therefore be to examine efforts at rhetorical 
entrapment concerning AP mines against other resistant states as well as armed non-state 
actors that have recently been shown to be susceptible to normative appeals under some 
circumstances.147 A comparative study of this kind could help to reveal characteristics such 
as bureaucratic structures and political ideology that facilitate or impede rhetorical 
entrapment.  
Yet the perceived material and political costs of policy choices are not intrinsic to 
particular topics but are intersubjectively constructed and thus the product of concerted 
agency. The present case study reinforces the vital importance of coordination between 
transnational civil society and domestic political elites whose diversity and cohesion provided 
the strategic social conditions for rhetorical entrapment against the US. This raises the 
question of whether other prominent humanitarian movements—such as the bans on cluster 
munitions and nuclear weapons—as well as earlier prohibitionary norms concerning 
chemical, biological, and blinding laser weapons have experienced similar success with 
respect to the US or other states. Cluster munitions represent the most direct analogue to the 
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AP mine ban and here too similar—albeit more modest—stigmatizing effects are visible. The 
US has not used cluster munitions since the 2003 invasion of Iraq (with one exception in 
2009). Public criticism of sales of the weapons to Saudi Arabia, and their subsequent use in 
Yemen, led to a suspension on exports globally in 2016; the last US company stopped 
producing cluster munitions in 2016, while the Air Force has announced a search for 
alternatives.148 Further studies could examine rhetorical entrapment with respect to the US 
and other prominent non-parties that have asserted objections to the global ban yet also show 
signs of the effects of a growing international opprobrium concerning the weapons.149 By 
contrast, the much more recent global movement to ban nuclear weapons has thus far 
struggled to generate support amongst nuclear weapons states and their allies. A cross-issue 
comparative study would help shed further light on further factors—such as the type of 
cooperative challenge, institutional design, and distribution of actor interests—that shape 
(in)effective stigmatization efforts. 
Third and finally, rhetorical contests play out against the backdrop of a more 
fundamental set of shared values and discursive frameworks that prominently include the 
language and practices of international law. Comparing the dynamics and impact of rhetorical 
entrapment in the context of multilateral treaties such as the MBT with non-legalized norms 
would contribute to ongoing debates concerning the effects of institutionalization on norm 
development.150 More fundamentally, it is worth carefully examining how the apparent rise 
of “post-truth” politics will transform the deployment and efficacy of rhetorical entrapment in 
circumstances where foundational meta-narratives and the very prospect for discerning facts 
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become the subject of contestation.151 Political elites that are willing to adopt the language of 
“fake news” may be able to resist the kind of external pressure described above.  
Yet this study has also highlighted reasons for optimism for those seeking to bind 
resistant actors more closely to global norms. US adaptation to the AP mine ban did not occur 
in a single moment, but through a gradual accretion of discursive and policy changes in 
response to external pressure, which set the stage for further engagement. Over time, 
individually modest shifts created path dependencies that limited the range of options 
available to decisionmakers leading to the near-total abandonment of a once ubiquitous 
weapon by the world’s preeminent military. In other words, while rhetorical entrapment 
functions first by exploiting social costs of non-conformance, forms of bureaucratic—rather 
than psychological—internalization can sustain its effects even when shame and prestige lose 
potency. This suggests that current US landmine policy will endure despite fluctuations in 
political leadership. 
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